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Analysis
Stephen Pimpare
This article offers a review of welfare reform evaluation studies, summarizing research that
has generated a consensus among mainstream policy analysts that the Personal Responsibil-
ity and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) has had few effects
beyond caseload reductions and increases in employment. Given that supporters and op-
ponents alike expected the law to have profound consequences, the article considers two
ways to explain this surprising outcome, showing that (1) quantitative policy analysis has
been ill equipped to capture the PRWORA’s effects and (2) expectations were nonethe-
less wrong because they failed to appreciate how thoroughly Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Children had already been eroded in the decades prior to its reform. Welfare reform
was not the beginning of a process of policy change; it was the end of one. In response to
these ﬁndings, the article describes how a more critical perspective on reform matters for
social work researchers, advocates, and practitioners.
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The Personal Responsibility and WorkOpportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996(PRWORA) (P.L. 104-193) marked its
15th anniversary on August 22, 2011. Although
amendments to the Social Security Act of 1935
(P.L. 74-271) had altered Title IV-A, Aid to De-
pendent Children (ADC), with some frequency,
the PRWORA was arguably the most substantial
reconﬁguration of American poor relief since the
New Deal. Opponents of the law offered dire
warnings as it moved toward enactment: One
study commissioned by the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) estimated that
more than 1 million children would be made
newly poor (Edelman, 1997), leading New York
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (1996) to call it
“the most regressive and brutal act of social policy
since Reconstruction” (p. 8076). Proponents, by
contrast, predicted that the PRWORA would
reduce out-of-wedlock births, increase marriage
rates, improve poor women’s labor force partici-
pation rates, and, as a result of these factors,
improve the material and moral well-being of
“dependent” families.
Curiously, it remains unclear which side was
right. Comprehensive policy evaluation is always
difﬁcult: Policy goals can be conﬂicting or ambig-
uous, determining causality remains an imperfect
science, policies may have diffuse impacts that are
impossible to fully trace, and accurate, consistent,
and comprehensive data may be unavailable or
hard to acquire. But the evaluation challenge
posed by the PRWORA seems to be greater than
that which normally prevails.
First, although it has been common to speak of
“welfare reform” in the singular, the PRWORA
established a national framework within which
states were expected to innovate to suit their own
preferences, and their implementing legislation has
varied along multiple dimensions, including thresh-
olds for determining eligibility; beneﬁt amounts;
categories of eligible individuals; time limit policies;
work requirements (including the deﬁnition of
work itself ); the availability and generosity of child
care subsidies; sanction policies; the use and content
of diversion programs or payments to discourage
applications; whether families are required to meet
school attendance, immunization, drug testing, or
health screening requirements; which policies and
programs are carried out by public agencies and
which are contracted or subcontracted to for-proﬁt
or not-for-proﬁt organizations (and how adequately
they are funded and monitored and the manner in
which their incentives are structured); and the
extent to which street-level implementation reﬂects
the law as written (Urban Institute, 1997–2008).
Further complicating evaluation, these policies,
their funding, and the manner in which they
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were implemented vary within states from county
to county and even city to city. As a consequence,
there are many more than merely 50 conﬁgura-
tions or “bundles” of policy reforms, and each
was carried into effect in locations that differed in
their unemployment rates, prevailing wages, and
opportunities available to the lower-skilled and
less-educated women who are the typical beneﬁ-
ciaries of welfare. Although there was variation
across states under ADC and its successor, Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC),
regarding eligibility rules and beneﬁt levels, states
were otherwise constrained by national standards.
One way we can productively alter our thinking
about PRWORA is to take more seriously the
fact that there has been no such thing as welfare
reform: There has, instead, been a multiverse of
welfare reforms, with variation far surpassing that
which is regularly produced by American-style
federalism.
Isolating and gauging the effects of PRWORA
have been additionally bedeviled by economic
circumstances. Most reforms went into effect
during the boom of the late 1990s, a period of
rapid growth and job creation, rising wages, and
low unemployment during which the Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC) underwent a large
expansion and supplemented the income of the
very population most affected by PRWORA,
making it difﬁcult to isolate the effects of
PRWORA during these years (Blank, 2007).
More recently, reforms have been put to another
test as the economy suffered its worst decline since
the Great Depression. Though in some ways
PRWORA was an ideal natural experiment, with
hundreds (if not thousands) of new approaches to
poor relief unfolding during a period of anoma-
lous boom followed by a historically deep and
broad trough, such conditions have taxed our
abilities to isolate program effects and to account
for variation across time, space, and program con-
ﬁguration. To make matters worse, because by
1996 there were 43 states already operating their
AFDC program under waivers granted by HHS
that allowed them to undertake their own welfare
“experiments,” not even the timing of reforms
is consistent (Grogger & Karoly, 2005; Ziliak,
2009).
Finally, the ability to gauge outcomes is hobbled
by the lack of consensus among researchers
on how to deﬁne success and, as a result, which
indicators are most salient (Cancian & Meyer,
2004), a problem rooted partly in the failure of
PRWORA to include standards or funding for its
evaluation (the closest the law came was a set of
general goals: to reduce welfare receipt and
out-of-wedlock pregnancies while “promoting”
work and marriage; §401). Variation is thereby
multiplied across even more dimensions as differ-
ent analysts identify differing dependent variables.
It is only a slight exaggeration to say that each
analysis of welfare reform has, for all intents and
purposes, examined a different program.
FINDINGS OF QUANTITATIVE POSTREFORM
EVALUATION RESEARCH
Evaluation studies have nevertheless not lacked in
quantity, variety, or sophistication, and because
of their abundance we have a growing corpus of
literature reviews and meta-analyses as well (Acs &
Loprest, 2007; Besharov, Germanis, & Rossi,
1997; Blank, 2002, 2007; Greenberg, Cebulla,
& Bouchet, 2005; Grogger & Karoly, 2005;
Grogger, Karoly, & Klerman, 2002; Lichter &
Jayakody, 2002; Michalopoulos, 2004; Ziliak,
2009). Yet for all this diversity and rigor, the most
succinct answer to the question of what we
know about the effects of PRWORA seems to
be this: very little. There is agreement among
researchers that welfare reforms contributed to
historic declines in the rolls and, at least for a
time, increases in poor women’s workforce partic-
ipation rates (with disagreement about the scale of
those contributions). Beyond that, there is little
consistent evidence of strong and signiﬁcant
effects, and the net impact appears to have been
modest. At the same time, because of the wealth
of research and the range of its ﬁndings, one can
identify an evaluation study to support almost any
claim (supporters and opponents alike have been
guilty on this count). Meta-analyses that seek cu-
mulative evidence or enduring patterns are there-
fore especially useful.
Although not the only early overview (see also
Blank, 2002), the consensus is encapsulated in a
2002 meta-analysis by the RAND Corporation
(Grogger et al., 2002) that reviewed 34 experi-
mental (random assignment) studies and 33 obser-
vational (econometric or regression) analyses.
The report’s summary chart (Table S.2) con-
tained, by my count, 242 cells identifying the
effects of 11 policies or policy bundles across 22
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outcome measures. It found “much evidence” to
support only 11 causal relationships: Mandatory
work-related activities had no demonstrable effects
on (1) marriage and (2) fertility rates, and their
effect on (3) income was mixed. Work require-
ments otherwise decreased (4) welfare and (5)
food stamp use, increased (6) employment and
(7) earnings, and negatively affected (8) school
achievement among adolescents. Cash bonuses
that were linked to the number of hours women
worked increased their (9) employment, (10)
earnings, and (11) total income. There was no
strong evidence—though there was, on occasion,
weak evidence—for any effects from the family
cap (which denied beneﬁts to children born while
their mother was on the rolls), time limits, or
sanctions (with the exception of some hint that
sanctions decreased welfare use). There was some
evidence for effects of various other program poli-
cies, notably on welfare use and employment
(although here, again, some of the evidence was
mixed rather than all pointing in the same direc-
tion), but there was little or no reliable evidence
of relationships between welfare policies and out-
comes for fully 204 of the cells in the matrix, or
84 percent of the relationships under consider-
ation (there was no reliable evidence at all for just
under half ).
This surprising pattern would hold: Evidence
accumulated that PRWORA decreased welfare
use, increased employment rates, and had no
effects on marriage or reproduction, whereas its
effects on the well-being of poor women and
their children would remain largely unexamined,
undetected, or unquantiﬁed. In later work,
Grogger and Karoly (2005) undertook another
meta-analysis, this time of 59 studies, and once
again, work requirements, the most studied provi-
sion of PRWORA, showed a negative impact on
welfare use and a positive impact on employment
and earnings from wages. The impact of work
requirements on total income and on poverty
rates remained unclear—ﬁndings were mixed or,
especially as related to poverty, not signiﬁcant—
and research continued to be unable to isolate
the consequences of time limits and sanctions.
There was only one study that found any signiﬁ-
cant relationship between any reform policy and
marriage or childbearing rates (and even insignif-
icant ﬁndings were roughly divided between
those that found positive and negative effects).
Similarly, studies examining child well-being
were about as likely to ﬁnd that work require-
ments helped as harmed children, whereas the
research on most other policies remained too
scant to conclude much of anything. As Grogger
and Karoly characterized the 132 cells of this
updated matrix, “61 are empty, and another 12
contain only insigniﬁcant results. Many of the
remaining cells contain a single signiﬁcant result”
(p. 248).
Blank’s (2007) less methodologically formal
review of the then-recent evaluation literature
likewise found strong evidence that welfare
reforms contributed signiﬁcantly to large caseload
declines and to (much smaller) increases in
women’s employment (although the expansion of
EITC and the strong economy were as important
as or more important than PRWORA) but that it
remained difﬁcult to identify “overall policy
lessons.” Reforms may have led to reductions in
health insurance coverage, but with few apparent
short-term effects on healthy behavior or health
outcomes. The new policies had seemingly
limited effects on child health or well-being but
signiﬁcant positive effects on the availability of
child care. PRWORA had no discernible effect
on marriage and, at best, very minor effects on
fertility, whereas it caused predictable changes in
consumption patterns, as more was spent on trans-
portation, clothing, and meals eaten out of the
home. It may have contributed to declines in
food stamp and Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) use (presumably because eligibility rates de-
clined as income from wages rose among the re-
search subjects) and seems to have had little or no
effect on savings rates among poor households.
Acs and Loprest (2007) came to similarly mixed
and modest conclusions in that same year, as did
Ziliak (2009) soon thereafter.
SOLVING BLANK’S CONUNDRUM
This vast body of state-of-the-art social science re-
search presents a conundrum, according to Blank,
a prominent policy analyst and former director of
the University of Michigan National Poverty
Center who since June 2012 has served as acting
secretary of the U.S. Commerce Department:
It is striking how many questions about the
effects of this policy change remain unan-
swered.…The movement off public assistance
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and into work was far greater than I would
have guessed possible in such a short period of
time… [but] given that such dramatic changes
did occur, I am surprised at how little [that
movement has] affected other domains of life
for these women. (Blank, 2007, pp. 2, 31–32)
There are two ways to approach solving this
apparent puzzle. First, it is possible that the re-
search is right but supporters’ and opponents’
expectations of large-scale change were wrong:
Welfare reform really has had only modest
effects beyond caseload reductions. Alternatively,
it could be that the predictions were accurate
and there have been other large, signiﬁcant
effects, but the research Blank and her peers
have relied on has been unable to capture them.
Let us turn ﬁrst to the latter possibility, given
how important it is for social workers who work
with and ﬁght for poor families to have accurate
information about the effectiveness of welfare
programs and policies: Has evaluation research
failed us?
Limitations of Mainstream Policy Analysis
We have sophisticated tools available for evaluat-
ing the effects of welfare reforms (for example,
Fang & Keane, 2004), but they are telling us little.
This is a consequence of the complexity of the
policies being enacted, their variation over time
and place, and the scarcity of reliable and consis-
tent data, to be sure, and the systematic evaluation
of PRWORA was always destined to be a chal-
lenge, as suggested earlier. But because the policy
sciences have come to rely on too narrow a range
of techniques, which are especially ill suited to
understanding the tumultuous and interdependent
lives of poor women with children, the results
have been more confounding than even a pessi-
mist might have predicted. Let me highlight a few
of the problems.
Most evaluations report average effects, which in
this case obscures the fact that different reforms or
bundles of reform may affect different categories of
poor women in different ways. Some programs or
program bundles may be effective for some sub-
populations but ineffective for others, distinctions
potentially lost depending on the methodology
used and the researcher’s sensitivity to such
variation and complexity. Precisely because the
impacts can be so disparate, however, this is a
crucial ﬂaw: Ziliak (2009), in this vein, posited that
PRWORA might be considered a success if we
examine outcomes on better-educated women
with younger children but a failure if we look at
their counterparts with less education and teenagers
at home. Yet even this distinction highlights the
problem, given that there seem to be nontrivial
numbers of women in the ﬁrst category also faring
poorly, and there are no satisfactory answers as to
why these particular differences should be. More
important, such judgments are made on the basis
of estimates of changes to household income, but
such households are not necessarily better off, de-
pending on what tradeoffs they have made or new
expenses they have incurred.
A related problem is that research has tended
toward snapshot and short-term analyses that
seldom capture the dynamism of the rolls or the
volatility of poor people’s economic lives, thereby
risking understating the decline in quality of life
in poor households (Heﬂin, 2006). Similarly, anal-
yses seldom offer comparison data from before
the implementation of Temporary Assistance to
Needy Families (TANF) in 1997 that help us
evaluate the meaning of their ﬁndings (but see
Bitler, Gelbach, & Hoynes, 2006; Cancian,
Haveman, Meyer, & Wolfe, 2002; Fang & Keane,
2004). Moreover, short-term studies (and most
analyses have focused on a time frame of at most
two years) cannot uncover evidence for effects
that may unfold over the long term, such as
changes in health outcomes or in marriage rates
and reproductive choices (Blank, 2007; Grogger
& Karoly, 2005), nor can most capture nominally
small (but proportionately large) ﬂuctuations in a
poor household’s income. To illustrate my point:
some research shows that families receiving bene-
ﬁts from the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP, formerly food stamps) are still
“food insecure” but 30 percent less so than they
would be otherwise (Ratcliffe & McKernan,
2010), yet other research has concluded that SNAP
participation does not reduce food insecurity
(Huffman & Jensen, 2008). We can explain this if
SNAP does reduce hunger but not dramatically
enough for it to consistently register in our data.
This may likewise be the case with cash welfare.
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Furthermore, TANF studies have generally
examined only a few variables at a time, limiting
opportunities to capture interaction effects or,
indeed, much of the complexity of policies and
poor people’s lives. The dilemma is that the most
convincing and methodologically sound analyses
are precisely those most narrowly focused on the
effects of discrete program elements on a distinct
population (Blank, 2007). Rarely have evaluations
been able to disentangle effects of various reform
components—time limits, sanctions, the family
cap, tax incentives—from the effects of an amor-
phous policy called “welfare reform” (Grogger &
Karoly, 2005). Furthermore, they may not be able
to separate out large economic effects for any of
them: Some of the research summarized previous-
ly ends before the recession of 2001, and none
of it captures the Great Recession of 2007 to
2009. Perhaps once the macroeconomic noise has
subsided, patterns of change related to TANF
policies will be easier to discern (but see Bitler &
Hoynes, 2010), for even though there was some
research consensus on postreform changes in em-
ployment, by the early 2000s those trends were in
retreat.
Average effects obscure other kinds of variation,
and we should note the paucity of research on
how outcomes vary by race, although there are in-
dications that African Americans have fared worse
(Cherlin, Frogner, Ribar, & Mofﬁtt, 2009). The
size of a state’s African American population has
been found to be a predictor of whether a state
would adopt restrictive TANF policies, and race
was a factor in imposing shorter time limits and
including a family cap provision (Soss, Schram,
Vartanian, & O’Brien, 2001). Racial biases may
also be affecting the implementation of TANF
polices in welfare ofﬁces, an outcome of particular
import to the social work profession (Fording,
Soss, & Schram, 2011;Watkins-Hayes, 2009).
Ironically, for all their attention to work, evalu-
ation studies have paid little attention to the labor
market effects of reform (Grogger & Karoly,
2005, Figure 10.1) or undertaken attempts to
situate relief withdrawal with broader develop-
ments in the U.S. and global political economy.
There are exceptions. Soss et al. (2001) found a
positive relationship between tough work-ﬁrst
TANF policies and high incarceration at the
state level, offering suggestive evidence for long-
standing claims by Piven and Cloward (1971) that
welfare programs function to discipline potentially
unruly populations and to regulate labor supply.
Soss et al. also found a signiﬁcant relationship
between a state’s unemployment rate and its
likelihood of adopting stricter rules under its
TANF program: States with tighter labor markets
adopted stricter work policies (forcing more
people into the low-wage labor market and
thereby reducing wages). More recently, Piven
(2006) saw overall government efforts at social
policy reform as simultaneously following con-
tractionary and expansionary tracks, as decommo-
difying programs (that is, those that enable
survival apart from the labor market) are reined in
(as with AFDC) and commodifying programs
(that is, those that enforce work) are expanded
(for example, EITC). This claim highlights what
can be lost by the restrictive purview of much re-
search: Analysts have focused almost exclusively on
the contractionary narrative (with AFDC and
TANF at the center) while ignoring the fact that
other portions of the welfare state have expanded
(including the most repressive institutions of the
criminal justice system). It is similarly notable that
analyses rarely use the decommodiﬁcation metric
referenced earlier despite the fact that it has domi-
nated comparative welfare state analysis for two
decades (Esping-Andersen, 1990). In this way, not
only has U.S. research on welfare and the welfare
state isolated itself from the scholarly questions that
have helped deﬁne the discipline for the rest of the
Western world, but it has failed to attend to the
range of policy changes that are likely having an
impact on poor American families, in turn ham-
pering social work advocates’ ability to make
sound decisions about where to target their efforts.
More curious (and perhaps surprising), although
research has determined that welfare reform
reduced the number of women receiving assis-
tance and pushed many into work, analysis of
how this has affected their well-being remains
scarce, in part because poverty has been among
the least-studied outcomes (Grogger & Karoly,
2005). Analysts have, even if unwittingly, allowed
antiwelfare reformers to frame their research agenda,
emphasizing caseloads and work effort at the
expense of other indicators. To the extent that
social work researchers have been complicit, this
is another indication of how a more critical ap-
praisal can lead us toward better policy analysis
and then better policy interventions.
Pimpare / Welfare Reform at 15 and the State of Policy Analysis 57
Insights from Ethnography
As we have seen, the analysis by economists,
political scientists, and some social workers and
sociologists that has dominated in policy research
organizations, in government agencies, and among
policy scholars has uncovered limited evidence of
signiﬁcant and sizable effects of PRWORA beyond
caseload declines and short-term employment and
wage increases. However, if we turn our attention
to the work of anthropologists, journalists, and
other social workers and sociologists, evidence of
signiﬁcant change becomes apparent as we hone in
on the lived experience of poor families (Anderson,
Halter, & Gryzlak, 2004; Collins & Mayer, 2010;
DeParle, 2004; Hays, 2003; Henrici, 2006;Morgen,
Acker, & Weigt, 2010; Morgen & Maskovsky,
2003; Seccombe, 2010; Watkins-Hayes, 2009;
Zedlewski & Golden, 2010).
Under TANF, bouts of economic insecurity
and household instability appear with much
more frequency than was the case under AFDC.
Indeed, while insecurity has increased across the
population, it has been more acute among poorer
Americans (Hacker, Rehm, & Schlesinger, 2010,
Figure 8). When employed, many poor women
do earn more than they would have from welfare,
but a relief check is reliable, whereas work is not,
in part because the exigencies of their lives make
it exceedingly difﬁcult to retain a job. We can see
how analyses would show increases in household
income over the near term as women entered the
labor market, but over time they may be left with
less income than if they had remained on welfare.
Many women report running out of food more
frequently and missing bill payments more often.
Another kind of insecurity faces their children,
and although changes in health, mental health,
school achievement, and criminal activity have
not consistently appeared in quantitative analyses,
there are clear indications of problems in this
other strain of research. It is suggestive (although
no more than that so far), moreover, that although
relief rolls have been declining (until quite recent-
ly), there were increases in homelessness, requests
for emergency food, and applications for
food stamps even before the Great Recession
(U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1995–2008;
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, 2007–2010).
We know that poor women are more likely
to suffer from mental illness, to have physical
disabilities, or to be caring for a sick or disabled
child; the lives of these women have been made
much worse, it seems. Anxiety, fear, depression,
and anger appear to have been exacerbated.
Taken together, these studies reveal the “varieties
of little-noticed suffering,” in Neubeck’s (2006,
p. 67) apt phrase. They do not offer us scientiﬁc
surety, telling us with precision how many
women are doing worse, or exactly how much
worse. But neither do the studies that aspire to
such quantiﬁcation, as we’ve seen. While there is
truth to the adage that the plural of anecdote is
not data, this growing body of ethnographic re-
search offers troubling indicators that welfare
reform has harmed poor families, suggesting
that we should treat with caution the claim that
there have been modest or minimal effects as a
result of PRWORA. At the same time, the
evidence available does not justify indictment of
PRWORA as a profound failure, either.
Errors of Expectation and the Prereform
Erosion of Relief
The previous discussion outlines one kind of ex-
planation for Blank’s conundrum: Reform has
been too varied and complex to be captured by
the tools that dominate policy research (and
public policymaking), although there is other evi-
dence that important changes have been occur-
ring in poor households. That said, it may
nevertheless not be that effects are large and re-
search is failing to capture them, but that effects
truly are small and expectations should have been
more modest. After all, although it was part of
many poor mothers’ strategy for getting through
the month, AFDC was always a relatively modest
portion of household income because its beneﬁts
were always meager: Never in the history of
AFDC in any state were its beneﬁts, even when
combined with the value of food stamps, enough
to lift a family above the poverty line (U.S. House
of Representatives, 2006).
As a consequence, households that received
income from welfare had to supplement it with
income from multiple other sources. Edin and
Lein (1997) documented this in their extended
study of the survival strategies of welfare-reliant
households in the pre-TANF era: Poor mothers
survived (then as now) thanks to help from
family, friends, neighbors, and partners; income
(legal and illegal) from other members of the
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household; irregular bouts of unreported income
from low-wage labor in the formal economy;
work in the informal economy; income from
other government programs; the bartering of ser-
vices and goods; and pawn shops, loan sharks,
payday loan brokers, or credit accounts with local
merchants. In Edin and Lein’s sample of AFDC
households, that program provided, on average,
35 percent of monthly income. We cannot and
should not dismiss the importance of that money,
especially for those households above the mean,
but it was a minority share of their total (it would
have to be, given beneﬁt levels). And AFDC was
even less important in states with lower beneﬁts:
In 1996, the maximum monthly beneﬁt for a
Mississippi family of three was $120 (Gabe, 2008).
Nationally, the average monthly beneﬁt in
1996 was $371 per family, with 4.5 million fami-
lies on the rolls. Before reform, welfare lifted 1
percent of poor people above the poverty line; by
contrast, the ﬁgures were 5 percent for SNAP and
10 percent for the EITC (HHS, 1997; Meyer,
2009). By 2006, with an average monthly beneﬁt
of $372 per family (in nominal dollars) and 1.8
million families on the rolls, TANF reduced
poverty by 0.6 percentage points; the comparable
ﬁgures were 2 to 3 points for SNAP and 5 for the
EITC and the Child Tax Credit. That’s a decline
of 40 percent but amounts to less than one half of
one percentage point. And in both periods TANF
was less important than other programs (which
saw comparable declines in their effectiveness). As
Gabe (2008) observed for the Congressional Re-
search Service, “cash welfare beneﬁts have little
impact on the poverty rate” (p. 16).
By 2006, the median maximum monthly cash
beneﬁt for a family of three equaled 29 percent of
the poverty line, compared with 35 percent in
1996 and 52 percent in 1981 (U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives, 2008, Tables 7-21, 7-22). It is worse
under TANF—beneﬁts are lower and reach fewer
people—but the relevant point is that the decline
long preceded PRWORA: The real average value
of maximum AFDC beneﬁts had already fallen 51
percent between 1970 and 1996 (U.S. House of
Representatives, 1996, p. 442). Moreover, to focus
solely on AFDC and TANF is to miss the larger
story of trends in U.S. social policy: Welfare bene-
ﬁts reached their peak value in 1968, the same year
the minimum wage hit its peak; unemployment
insurance beneﬁts reached their peak in 1972, food
stamps in 1981, and disability insurance in 1982
(although the EITC reached its peak in 2000)
(Mettler & Milstein, 2007).
Had AFDC played a more central role in the
economic lives of poor women, we might expect
more dramatic effects to have appeared in the data
when former recipients were cut off. Fears that
PRWORA would cause massive disruption in the
lives of poor single-parent families were thus
overblown: Because the value and reach of AFDC
had already been so thoroughly eroded by 1996,
welfare reform’s direst effects have been contained
to a subset of the most desperate and vulnerable
Americans. The harm caused by PRWORA has
been real, but damage has not been widespread—
making it invisible to many analysts and their
tools of evaluation—because welfare use was not
widespread. Scholars had been writing about the
declining value of AFDC for years prior to 1996,
but the implications of that were not taken seri-
ously enough in predictions about the effects of
PRWORA. That it was such a widespread misdi-
agnosis suggests that social policy analysis needs to
more consistently attend to incremental change
and that efforts by social workers to defend AFDC
came much too late.
We are accustomed to expecting policy change
to emerge from high-proﬁle battles over the
enactment or, in this instance, the repeal of
landmark legislation—the Social Security Act,
Medicare, or the Patient Protection and Afford-
able Care Act. But change can also come incre-
mentally, and entirely new policy regimes can
quietly come into being over long periods of ex-
pansionary feedback and drift (Hacker & Pierson,
2010; Pierson, 2004). AFDC had undergone such
change well before PRWORA (and had never
been the central source of support for poor
households), but because AFDC had been so suc-
cessfully wielded as a political weapon to such re-
markable effect, there has been misapprehension
of the true nature of the program and the role it
has played in the lives of poor mothers. The
effects of PRWORA have been hard to see
because the beneﬁts of the welfare programs it tar-
geted had already been quietly whittled away. Its
enactment in this way was more the end stage of
a process of policy change than it was the begin-
ning of one, and the widespread surprise over the
limited evidence of TANF’s impact may be
because debate about PRWORA was so charged:
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Proponents and opponents were all deeply invest-
ed in its success or failure and used rhetoric that
prophesied transformative success or catastrophic
failure, with little demand for more circumspect
projections.
CONCLUSION
The diverse reforms enacted thanks to PRWORA
reduced welfare receipt, as intended, and half of
those who are eligible for assistance are now on
the rolls (Rosenberg et al., 2008). Such declines
are a relevant indicator of PRWORA’s effects,
but a narrow one: It is not obvious that a reduc-
tion in enrollments per se is an outcome deserving
of approbation. The logic of these reforms dictates
that work is always better than nonwork (at least
for poor women), that welfare receipt is always
the least desirable option, and that poor women
are unable to make sound decisions regarding
marriage and childbearing without state interven-
tion. These are contestable claims, but they are
the assumptions undergirding PRWORA. There
is a related bias in much of the mainstream TANF
analysis, captured succinctly when, tempering his
estimation that on balance research points to a
small negative net outcome, Ziliak (2009, p. 17)
wrote, “On the plus side, long-term dependence
on welfare has been cut substantially, if not alto-
gether eliminated for a majority of recipients, and
the number of new recipients has been slashed.”
Beyond the fact that reducing the rolls was a
goal of PRWORA (and setting aside debates
about whether long-term use was in fact the
experience of most AFDC recipients), why should
such declines be counted “on the plus side”
absent an evaluation of those women’s well-
being? Ziliak simultaneously adopted an uncritical
usage of dependence that ignores a large body of
feminist scholarship going back, at least, to Fraser
and Gordon’s (1994) “A Genealogy of
Dependency.”
The failure to comprehend the material circum-
stances, the lived experiences, and the actual, rather
than imagined, constraints and opportunities in
poor households has contributed to the murky
conclusions of policy analyses and their inability
to discern the effects of PRWORA, drawing
renewed attention to what can be missed by the
scholarly fetishization of quantitative methods
(Pierson, 2007) and, as with Ziliak (2009), high-
lighting the biases of “objective” policy research.
Ethnography has its limits, too (Wedeen, 2010),
but it may be that there is a need to eschew an
impulse to identify generalizable patterns and
quantiﬁable outcomes and accept that welfare
repeals are unfolding in very different ways de-
pending on the particular programmatic conﬁgura-
tion of policies in various states and localities and
local economic and labor market conditions. What
has been found in ethnographic studies of poor
women and their households is that their lives,
always difﬁcult, have been made differently
difﬁcult—better for some, worse for others, mostly
still awful, but differently awful. Those differences
can be described, but it may be that they cannot
be quantiﬁed. This observation can serve as
another reminder of how important it is for case
workers to comprehend the particular challenges
facing each family before them, to resist assump-
tions about what causes women to turn to public
assistance, and simultaneously to resist the impulse
to offer each the same solution. Although this may
seem obvious in the abstract, ample research
demonstrates that it often fails in practice (see,
for example, Fording et al., 2011; Hays, 2003;
Watkins-Hayes, 2009).
The failure to better explore the relationship
between TANF and other sources of income in
poor households is another problem: If welfare
reform can be understood as one instantiation of
a new political economy of neoliberal retrench-
ment or of globalization, as some scholars have
argued (Collins & Mayer, 2010; Piven, 2006),
then narrow, isolated, econometric analyses of
TANF data alone have little chance of shedding
light on the processes at work or on the ways
macro-level activities affect the individual or the
household at the micro level. To focus so relent-
lessly on TANF in isolation is like a physician at-
tempting to diagnose a patient while refusing to
examine more than her or his blood pressure.
In 2009, 32 percent of food pantry clients re-
ported that their primary source of income was
employment; for 23 percent, it was social security;
for 10 percent, it was Social Security Disability
Insurance (SSDI) or workers’ compensation. For
only 1.3 percent, TANF was their principal
support (Mabli, Cohen, Potter, & Zhao, 2010).
Only 5 percent of the households surveyed report-
ed any income from TANF, whereas over
6 percent received income from their local General
Assistance Program. Higher percentages received
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income from work (38 percent), social security
(33 percent), unemployment insurance (8 percent),
SSDI or workers’ compensation (17 percent), SSI
(19 percent), relatives (11 percent), pensions
(8 percent), or child support (6 percent). The only
income sources on which fewer clients relied than
TANF were alimony (0.4 percent) and child
care subsidies (2.3 percent) (Mabli et al., 2010).
For the 593,900 food pantry clients who received
income from TANF (and the 65,200 soup kitchen
patrons and 48,700 shelter residents), these funds
were, perhaps quite literally, vital. But they were
utterly immaterial for the other 36 million who
were nonetheless poor enough to seek emergency
food. It is ﬁtting and proper that research,
advocacy, and casework be devoted to TANF, but
the attention to the program has been out of
proportion to its usefulness to poor families, and,
as a consequence, scarce resources of time, energy,
attention, and money have been misallocated.
For most poor families, the program that has
been transformed from ADC to AFDC to TANF
is now irrelevant, for rather than “ending welfare
as we know it,” we have, for all but a few, ended
welfare. In its place is a more complex array of
supports on which they must rely. Evaluation
studies have not ignored these other sources, but
given the transformation, it is time to shift the
emphasis from measuring the effects of TANF and
other individual programs to developing data and
tools for evaluating the well-being of families,
looking for patterns in where their income comes
from, how income sources change over time, and
how these changes affect their household. Since
the passage of welfare reform, the safety net has
become less effective at lifting people out of
poverty; it has become even less effective at lifting
children out of poverty and at lifting children
out of deep poverty (Sherman, 2009). TANF,
however, represents only a portion of this failure,
and short of signiﬁcant (and unlikely) changes to
PRWORA or to state-level implementing legisla-
tion, its impact will remain marginal, given its
narrow reach. As a result, analyses that focus on
TANF will continue to be unable to shed much
light on poor families, and social work advocates
who focus too narrowly on welfare risk failing to
attend to other programs that may have a greater
impact on poor households. The symbolic power
of the old welfare program remains, but it now
matters too little for it to receive such a
disproportionate share of analysis. It is time for us
to end welfare scholarship as we know it.
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